When a one-thousand-dollar mine can severely damage a one-billion-dollar ship...it is time to do something about it (Edney, 1).
The significance of mines to naval operations has been recognized in modern warfare. For example, during the Korean War the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman observed before an amphibious assault on Wonsan:
When you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation for all our war plans. We've been very submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we're getting mine-conscious, beginning last week (Tamara, 78) .
Amphibious mining played havoc in North Vietnam, the Suez Canal, the Falkland Islands, and in Operation Desert Storm.
During the Gulf War, Iraqi mining operations in the coastal waters and along prospective assault beaches directly influenced U.S. plans for possible amphibious operations, causing Admiral Frank B. Kelso II to remark:
I believe there are some fundamentals about mine warfare we should not forget. Once mines are in place, they are quite difficult to get rid of. That is not likely to change. I think it is probably going to get worse, because mines are going to get more sophisticated (CNO, 1).
The Marine Corps Amphibious Force of the 21st century will be the best in the world only if effective systems are developed and proper training is provided to conduct mine countermeasures.
Unfortunately, the Navy and Marine Corps still lack the ability to counter all types of mines effectively at all water depths.
For that reason, the U.S. and its allies should proceed in full force to take initiative in developing and funding programs necessary to improve mine countermeasures capabilities.
The first major lesson learned from Operation Desert Storm was that the Navy lacked a unified command structure. The mine countermeasures commander's staff consisted of twenty-three individuals assembled from twenty-one different commands, resulting in a command staff that was ill prepared for its task.
Second, mine warfare forces, both the Navy and Marine Corps need to improve readiness through sustained and joint training with existing equipment and doctrine. Third, the Navy acknowledges the need to identify and acquire the necessary resources to carry out its MCM mission.
One of the significant limitations demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm was the Navy's inability to conduct mine countermeasures in shallow waters, one of its greatest challenges. The Navy recognized the need to develop this capability because enemy forces can easily lay mines and obstacles in shallow water; this area is closest to the enemy shorelines and surf action buries many mines making them harder to detect. Without a shallow water mine countermeasures capability, the only alternative for the amphibious forces would be to avoid an enemy minefield and make an approach in another area. The risk associated with this maneuver, however, is that enemy forces maybe able to anticipate the location of amphibious landings more easily. However, critical limitations identified during Operation Desert Storm still exist today. While the Navy is pursuing several projects to address these limitations, it
has not developed a long-range plan that identifies a baseline of its system's current capabilities and weaknesses nor has it established priorities among its competing projects to sustain the development and procurement of the most needed systems.  Ensuring the continued readiness of current specialized MCM forces, decreasing the time required to respond to mine threats, and improving the ability of our forces to counter the evolving complexity of the world's mine threat technology.
 Developing and fielding a comprehensive mine countermeasures capability in the Very Shallow Water (VSW) region, Surf Zone (SZ), and Craft Landing Zone (CLZ) to support the operational concepts of Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), and the associated tactic of Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM).
 Fielding organic mine countermeasures systems in the fleet to give operating forces the ability to conduct timely mine countermeasures operations.
 Executing an mine countermeasures Fleet Engagement
Strategy to ensure the coordinated development of professional education, training, tactics, doctrine, science and technology initiatives, public affairs, and naval and Department of Defense (DOD) policies necessary in order to deliver operational expertise coincident with delivery of organic systems to the fleet (NMWP, 5). Breaching System (SABRE) programs are examples of two of these projects. Initially, the Navy planned to destroy enemy mines in the surf zone by deploying these systems from the beach into the water. The Navy has since changed its strategy and is now planning to deploy these systems from the water onto the beach off of Landing Craft Air-Cushion (LCAC) vehicles. This change in strategy has resulted in an initial operating capability delay of about two years. Due to this decision, the Navy had to redesign the rocket propulsion mechanisms that would deliver these systems to the targeted area and conduct additional testing to examine the impact of launching DET and SABRE from an unstable platform. Unfortunately, around fiscal year 1998 or 1999 these two systems were cancelled due to budget constraints.
Amphibious mines remain a barrier that may restrict our success in regional conflicts or "littoral" warfare. They can disrupt shipping lines of communication and destroy battle
plans; yet few nations, including the United States, possess the mine countermeasures capability to overcome the threat. The U.S.
recognition of the complexity of mine countermeasures and the limitations of one system for all types of mines at all water depths is a step in the right direction. However, progress toward correcting resource imbalances has not been made and shortfalls in the response to the growing threat still exist today. Currently, the Navy and Marine Corps have no single system that can provide the capability to conduct mine countermeasures from deep water to the beach. Therefore, our ability to conduct amphibious breach from shallow water to surf zone in an opposed beach is none. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps do not have definitive plans that identify additional systems needed to acquire necessary shallow water to surf zone capabilities in the future.
